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Abstract 
This paper highlights the role of behavioral factors for efficiency measurement in supply 
networks. To this aim, behavioral issues are investigated among interrelations between decision 
makers involved in corporate bond service networks. The corporate bond network was 
considered in three consecutive stages, where each stage represents the relations between two 
members of the network: issuer-underwriter, underwriter-bank, and bank-investor. Adopting a 
multi-method approach, we collected behavioral data by conducting semi-structured interviews 
and applying the critical incident technique. Financial and behavioral data, collected from each 
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stage in 20 corporate bond networks, were analyzed using fuzzy network data envelopment 
analysis to obtain overall and stage-wise efficiency scores for each network. Sensitivity 
analyzes of the findings revealed inefficiencies in the relations between underwriters-issuers, 
banks-underwriters, and banks-investors stemming from certain behavioral factors. The results 
show that incorporating behavioral factors provides a better means of efficiency measurement 
in supply networks. 
Keywords: Behavioural operations, corporate bonds service network, network data 
envelopment analysis, fuzzy sets  
1 Introduction 
Although the subject of behavior has long been popular among organizational, managerial, and 
business fields of study (e.g., strategy, marketing, economics, and finance), certain aspects of 
behavior have been introduced quite recently into the operations and supply chain management 
domain for modeling relevant real-world situations (Bendoly et al. 2010; Croson et al. 2013). 
Behavioral factors, which reside in behavioral irrationalities embedded in individuals’ choices, 
social preferences, or bounded rationalities (Özer and Zheng 2012), can result in biased 
judgments and erroneous decision making. Understanding these behavioral irrationalities is 
essential if we are to manage them effectively in supply chains (Carter et al. 2007). Moreover, 
it has been argued that behavioral factors play an important role in causing several supply 
chain-related problems (e.g., bullwhip effects), even when almost all other sources of 
operational errors are eliminated (Wan and Evers 2011; Croson et al. 2014). 
Including behavioral factors in supply chain decision-making models results in better 
predictability and more effective operating systems (Giannoccaro and Ilaria 2013). The latter 
could especially enhance the predictability of empirical and analytical models that aim to 
improve decision-making processes (Hämäläinen et al. 2013; Tiwana et al. 2007). However, 
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such approaches are generally overlooked because the aforementioned analytical models are 
considered too complex to solve (Mingers 2011). Nonetheless, Bendoly et al. (2006), p. 739 
argue that, despite the seemingly different assumptions between mathematical models of 
operations and methods used for studying human behavior, “the two methodologies can 
complement each other with each positing useful directions of inquiry for the other”. Bendoly 
et al. (2015) also argue that considering the bounded rationalities of decision makers in 
mathematical models of operations opens up new avenues and opportunities to better 
comprehend and manage operations within a given context. That said, managers and 
researchers alike would benefit from a greater understanding of how behavioral factors play a 
role in decision-making processes in supply networks and, likewise, the effect they have on 
supply network efficiency. 
Following the call for “high-quality research that is able to influence both thought and 
practice” surrounding the “human factor” in the field of supply chain management Fawcett et 
al. (2011), p. 119, we focused on including behavioral factors in data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) models for measuring efficiency in supply networks. DEA models encompass a wide 
spectrum of applications in industry and services to tackle various aspects of efficiency 
measurement in supply networks (e.g., Chen and Yan 2011; Wu and Olson 2009; Talluri et al. 
2013). Our study looked particularly at supply networks within the banking industry, 
describing a three-stage supply chain process for issuing corporate bonds. Our motivation to 
investigate the banking industry was twofold. First, of all business sectors, the banking industry 
is believed to have the highest rate of application of DEA models (Liu et al. 2013; Wu and 
Birge 2012), offering established and validated approaches to model building and efficiency 
measurement in this context (Paradi and Zhu 2013). Second, close interactions between 
decision makers in the banking industry and corporate bond networks during the bond issuing 
and underwriting processes could potentially expose this network to substantial behavioral 
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risks. Thereby, the purpose of this study was to provide evidence of how behavioral factors 
influence the efficiency of supply networks by considering the efficiency of both operational 
and decision-making processes throughout different stages of a supply network, and by 
leveraging a multi-method approach that encompassed both semi-structured interviews and 
DEA. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Next, we review the literature on the 
application of behavioral sciences in supply networks, focusing specifically on several 
behavioral misconducts and their adverse consequences in corporate bond service networks. 
The summary of the application of network DEA in different industrial and service contexts in 
the literature review section leads to description of a fuzzy network DEA model developed for 
the three-stage corporate bond network. In the methodology section we also explain the 
application of semi-structured interviews and critical incident technique to collect data related 
to behavioral factors in the corporate bond network. We then incorporate both behavioral and 
financial data into the fuzzy network DEA model, discussing the numerical outcomes of 
applying the proposed model to the banking industry of Iran, and examining the robustness of 
the results. Finally, we summarize the highlights of the study, outline its limitations and note 
avenues for future research. 
 
2 Literature review 
The study of behavioral issues in operations and supply chain management discourse is an 
emerging, multi-disciplinary field that is gaining increasing momentum (Bendoly et al. 2010; 
Knemeyer and Naylor 2011). One of the main reasons for this growing interest is that current 
models of real-world processes often fail to reflect human behavior, despite being one of the 
main drivers in operating systems (Giannoccaro and Ilaria 2013; Bendoly et al. 2015). Studying 
behavioral factors in the context of supply chains and supply networks is described as “the 
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study of how judgment in supply management decision-making deviates from the assumptions 
of homo economicus” (Carter et al. 2007, p. 634). Investigating behavioral factors associated 
with decision-making processes within the context of inventory management (e.g., newsvendor 
problem (Su 2008; Nagarajan and Shechter 2014), bullwhip effects, and supply line 
underweighting (N. M. Wang et al. 2014; Croson et al. 2014)) has helped further explain 
deviations in efficiency that could not be described from taking a solely operational point of 
view. 
Research into behavioral operations and supply chain management has offered 
opportunities for investigating decision makers’ behavior, mostly based on cognitive 
psychology (Gino and Pisano 2008; Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer 2013). For instance, loss 
aversion and risk aversion biases have been used primarily for inventory management problems 
such as the newsvendor problem to model managers’ decision-making behavior (Wang and 
Webster 2009; Agrawal and Seshadri 2000). Studies have also investigated other types of 
cognitive biases, or even more general estimations of cognitive abilities of decision makers, 
and their impact on supply chain-related operations (Wu and Chen 2014; Narayanan and Moritz 
2015). Some researchers have studied the effect of trust between members of supply chains 
(Özer et al. 2014; Read et al. 2014). Others have emphasized psychological aspects such as 
social psychology, group dynamics, or system dynamics in the context of behavioral operations 
and supply chain management (Bendoly et al. 2010; Bendoly 2014). The breadth of previous 
research illustrates that behavioral issues can affect efficiency in supply networks either at the 
level of individual decision makers or through their interactions with other individuals, groups, 
or even organizations. While it is impossible to capture all the behavioral facets for a specific 
context, we next propose several decision making-related scenarios in corporate bond networks 
in which certain behavioral anomalies could occur and have an adverse effect on tier-specific 
and/or overall efficiency of the network.  
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2.1 Behavioral Factors Emerging and Propagating in the Corporate Bond Network 
The corporate bond underwriting and issuance network consists of corporate clients as 
“issuers”, investment banks or corporate banks as “underwriters”, and “investors” as buyers of 
the bonds. Underwriters and commercial banks provide bonds issuing and underwriting 
services such as insurance for the unsold bonds and other types of services associated with 
pricing, marketing, documenting, and selling the bonds (Yasuda 2005, 2007). For their existing 
corporate clients, commercial banks opt for either their own corporate banking division or 
investment bank(s), or both, as underwriter(s) of corporate bonds. 
However, several behavioral factors involved in the bilateral relations of network members 
could adversely affect the efficiency of operations within the network. For instance, in 
underwriter-issuer relations, different types of risks might arise if there is no previous history 
of constructive and collaborative relations between the bank and the corporate client. 
According to goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham 2002; Latham and Locke 1991), when 
building up good relations with clients is not a unanimously accepted goal among employees, 
there is insufficient motivation in the organization to put much effort and investment into 
strengthening relations with corporate customers. Even if banks accept specific and detailed 
goals regarding how corporate clients should be treated, the absence of salient and timely 
control mechanisms (i.e., Control Theory; (Bandura 2001, 1989) could fail to regulate the bank 
employees’ behavior toward their corporate clients, leading to diminishing quality of services 
for clients and deteriorating relations between bank and client. Subsequently, clients are prone 
to assume (Mussweiler and Strack 2001; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) that further similar 
collaborations with the bank, including bonds underwriting and issuance, could yield the same 
undesirable results. This lack of trust between bank and client imposes additional costs on the 
bank to improve relations with the corporate client (Friend and Johnson 2014).  
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The efficiency of the underwriting process also depends upon how the underwriter and the 
bank interact. A commercial bank’s decision makers may choose an underwriter based on  
financial incentives; however, a number of behavioral factors could also come into play. First, 
both opting for an external investment bank as an underwriter and lack of trust between the 
bank and the investment bank would increase the bank’s supervisory costs in eliminating any 
opportunistic behavior by the investment bank (Villena et al. 2011; Wathne and Heide 2000). 
The likely opportunistic behavior of the investment bank as the supplier of financial services 
could be reflected in the investment bank offering superior services or significant discounts to 
the issuer. Second, banks’ decision makers might overestimate (Moore and Healy 2008; 
Bazerman and Moore 2012) the ability of the underwriter (especially their own corporate 
banking division) to provide quality services to their corporate clients. This overestimation 
might result in poor-quality services, customer dissatisfaction, and unsold bonds. 
Bank-investor relations are also subject to risks from behavioral factors. Considering loss-
aversion bias, for instance (Kahneman et al. 1991), the behavior of a bank’s decision makers 
toward investors could depend on how these decision makers define and perceive losses and 
gains in their relations with issuers. Corporate banks that are making inroads into the corporate 
bonds market usually tend to charge issuers with lower fees for the costs of underwriting and 
issuance services (Yasuda 2005; Gande et al. 1999), with the aim of building good relations 
with existing issuers and to avoid losing their existing corporate clients at any cost. However, 
these generous offerings might subsequently culminate in charging the investors higher prices 
for bonds to compensate for any financial losses (Yasuda 2007). Moreover, banks that are 
reluctant to lose their corporate clients at any cost might misuse their reputation in certifying 
the issuers’ quality of bonds for less informed investors (Andres et al. 2014; Mathis et al. 2009). 
Such issues could affect investors’ trust and willingness to purchase the bonds. 
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Given the complexity of decision-making processes in real-world supply networks (e.g., 
corporate bond network), behavioral misconduct can extend beyond what has been discussed 
thus far. However, irrespective of their origin, poor-quality relations (e.g., lack of trust) arising 
from inadequate decision making could adversely affect the overall efficiency in supply 
networks. Hence, in the remaining sections of this manuscript, and more explicitly in 
conducting the case study, we adopt a more general view of behavioral issues in corporate bond 
networks, addressing how the “quality of relations” between supply network members can 
enhance efficiency. 
 
2.2 DEA and Network DEA in Banking Industry 
Since Charnes et al. (1978) introduced data envelopment analysis (DEA), numerous studies 
have used DEA, either singly or in combination with mathematical and/or statistical models, 
to measure relative efficiency of decision making units (DMUs) (Emrouznejad et al. 2008). 
DEA has been widely applied to measure efficiency in certain tiers or in the overall processes 
of supply chains (Liang et al. 2006; Yang et al. 2011). However, conventional DEA models do 
not consider the internal processes of DMUs; rather, they treat the system as a “black box”. 
The network DEA model (Fare and Grosskopf 2000), an alternative to the black box model, 
enables managers to identify sources of inefficiencies in different stages of a network (Kao and 
Hwang 2008, 2010; Kao 2014). Network DEA has been applied extensively, from the banking 
industry (e.g.,  Lozano 2015; Matthews 2013; Akther et al. 2013) to other industrial and 
services sectors (Mirhedayatian et al. 2014; Moreno and Lozano 2014; Vaz et al. 2010). Several 
recent studies have applied network DEA to the banking industry, measuring the efficiency of 
commercial banks: Akther et al. (2013) evaluated the efficiency of 21 commercial banks in 
Bangladesh in a two-staged network using the slacks-based inefficiency measure; Matthews 
(2013) developed a three-stage network slacks-based DEA framework that incorporated risk 
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measures (i.e., financial and human resources-related risks) and non-profit loans to evaluate 
the efficiency of 15 domestic and commercial banks and four foreign banks in China; and K. 
Wang et al. (2014) adopted an additive two-stage DEA with non-profit loans as undesirable 
outputs to measure the efficiency of 16 main Chinese commercial banks, identifying several 
factors that improve efficiency in this sector. 
Despite focusing on commercial banking, our study differs from the above in several ways. 
First, we did not limit the inputs and outputs of the corporate bond network model to merely 
tangible financial criteria; rather, we included the behavioral issues that might arise in this 
network, indicated by the “quality of relations” between each of the members in this network. 
Second, we considered only those processes related to issuing and underwriting bonds 
(excluding loans and deposits) by commercial banks. In this way we adopted a holistic view 
that incorporates all the players (i.e., issuer, underwriter, bank, and investors) within the 
corporate bond network as one single DMU. 
 
3 Methodology 
We adopted a multi-method approach using both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
to capture operational and decision making-related inefficiencies in the corporate bond 
network. Multi-method approaches apply multiple methodologies from the same or different 
disciplines and are ideal for studying a phenomenon and understanding its complexities 
(Sanders and Wagner 2011; Boyer and Swink 2008). Indeed, the increased rigor and reliability 
of adopting multi-method approaches results in “greater insights into research problems, 
reduction in the myopic, disciplined-based perspective, and greater potential for innovative 
SCM [Supply Chain Management] breakthroughs” (Sanders and Wagner (2011), p. 318. 
Similarly, combining several research methodologies such as survey, archival, behavioral, and 
case studies allows a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and increases the practical 
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contributions of the research (Fawcett and Waller, 2011). In this section, we first use DEA 
modeling as a quantitative method to model all operational and behavioral factors that could 
affect efficiency in the corporate bond network. We then discuss the case, further describing 
the semi-structured interview and critical incident technique used to gather in-depth 
information about the underlying behavioral factors affecting the quality of relations within 
this network. 
 
3.1 Network DEA Model of the Corporate Bond Network 
Figure 1 presents the three stages in the corporate bond network and their associated inputs, 
outputs, and intermediary inputs/outputs. We aimed to measure technical efficiency instead of 
cost or allocative efficiency of the corporate bond network. To this end, we adopted the 
frequently used “intermediation approach” to assign interest expenses and non-interest 
expenses as inputs, and interest income and non-interest income as outputs (for more 
information see, Fethi and Pasiouras 2010). Given the dynamics of the corporate bond network 
and the exclusion of interest incomes (i.e. loans and deposits), we defined several non-interest 
expenses and non-interest incomes in the three stages of the corporate bond network as inputs 
and outputs. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
As shown in Figure 1, personnel expenses (PE) (𝑥11,𝑥21) and various other operational 
expenses (OOE) (𝑥12, 𝑥22) are used separately by the bank and underwriter in both Stage I and 
Stage II to yield referrals for bond underwriting and issuance (NoF) (𝑧1) and to issue bonds 
(NV) (𝑧2). Other operational expenses for marketing and selling bonds (OOE) (𝑥31) in Stage 
III are inputs to produce final non-interest incomes of the network, including proportion of 
bonds sold to total bonds (SBT) (𝑦31) and net fees and commissions (NFC) (𝑦32). Depending 
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on the quality of relations between network members, hidden costs of deteriorating relations 
and lack of trust in the network might also be considered, although these are not traditionally 
captured as a form of non-interest expenses. We therefore added the quality of bilateral 
relations (QoR) between underwriter-issuer (?̃?13), bank-underwriter (?̃?23), and bank-investors 
(?̃?32) as the additional inputs to the three stages in Figure 1, illustrated by dotted lines. Since 
there are no financial records or tangible measures to assess these behavioral inputs, and there 
are varying levels of uncertainties associated with them when evaluated by decision makers, 
we applied fuzzy sets theory to include quality of bilateral relations in our network DEA model. 
The “~” sign in the figure shows that the variables representing QoR in three stages of the 
corporate bond network are associated with some level of uncertainty. 
Following Kao (2009) and Fare et al. (1989), the overall efficiency of the corporate bond 
network (Figure 1) for DMUk using the network DEA is formulated in model (1): 
𝐸𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13?̃?13
𝑘 + 𝑣23?̃?23
𝑘 + 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32?̃?32
𝑘  
𝑠. 𝑡.
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑢31𝑦31
𝑗 + 𝑢21𝑦32
𝑗
∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑗 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
)2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13?̃?13
𝑗 + 𝑣23?̃?23
𝑗 + 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑗 + 𝑣32?̃?32
𝑗
≤ 1
𝑤1𝑧1
𝑗
∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑗
)2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13?̃?13
𝑗
≤ 1
𝑤2𝑧2
𝑗
∑ (𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
)2𝑖=1 + 𝑣23?̃?23
𝑗 +𝑤1𝑧1
𝑗
≤ 1
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑗 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑗
𝑣31𝑥31
𝑗 + 𝑣32?̃?32
𝑗 +𝑤2𝑧2
𝑗
≤ 1
 
𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
𝑢31, 𝑢32 ≥ 0
𝑣11, 𝑣12, 𝑣13, 𝑣21, 𝑣22, 𝑣23, 𝑣31, 𝑣32 ≥ 0
𝑤1, 𝑤2 ≥ 0
 
(1) 
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where 𝑥ℎ𝑖
𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1,2,3 denotes the 𝑖th input, 𝑦ℎ𝑟
𝑗 , 𝑟 = 1,2 the 𝑟th output, and 𝑧𝑓
𝑗 , 𝑓 = 1,2 of the 
𝑓th intermediary input/output of 𝑗th DMU, 𝑗 = 1,…𝑛 for the ℎth sub-process, ℎ = 1,2,3. The 
linear equivalent of model (1) (Charnes and Cooper 1962) is presented in model (2): 
𝐸𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑢31𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑘  
𝑠. 𝑡.
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13?̃?13
𝑘 + 𝑣23?̃?23
𝑘 + 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32?̃?32
𝑘 = 1
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑗 + 𝑢21𝑦32
𝑗 − (∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑗 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
)
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13?̃?13
𝑗 + 𝑣23?̃?23
𝑗 + 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑗 + 𝑣32?̃?32
𝑗 ) ≤ 0
𝑤1𝑧1
𝑗 − (∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑗
)
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13?̃?13
𝑗 ) ≤ 0
𝑤2𝑧2
𝑗 − (∑ (𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
)
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣23?̃?23
𝑗 +𝑤1𝑧1
𝑗) ≤ 0
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑗 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑗 − (𝑣31𝑥31
𝑗 + 𝑣32?̃?32
𝑗 +𝑤2𝑧2
𝑗) ≤ 0
𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
𝑢31, 𝑢32 ≥ 0
𝑣11, 𝑣12, 𝑣13, 𝑣21, 𝑣22, 𝑣23, 𝑣31, 𝑣32 ≥ 0
𝑤1, 𝑤2 ≥ 0
 
(2) 
Once the optimal values of multipliers  𝑢31
∗ , 𝑢32
∗ , 𝑣11
∗ , 𝑣12
∗ , … , 𝑣32
∗ , and 𝑤1
∗, 𝑤2
∗  are obtained 
using model (2), the overall network efficiency and efficiency of sub-processes are calculated 
using equations (3a–3d): 
𝐸𝑘 =
𝑢31
∗ 𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32
∗ 𝑦32
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖
∗ 𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖
∗ 𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13
∗ ?̃?13
𝑘 + 𝑣23
∗ ?̃?23
𝑘 + 𝑣31
∗ 𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32
∗ ?̃?32
𝑘  (3a) 
𝐸𝑘
1 =
𝑤1
∗𝑧1
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖
∗ 𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13
∗ ?̃?13
𝑘
 (3b) 
𝐸𝑘
2 =
𝑤2
∗𝑧2
𝑘
∑ (𝑣2𝑖
∗ 𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣23
∗ ?̃?23
𝑘 +𝑤1
∗𝑧1
𝑘
 (3c) 
𝐸𝑘
3 =
𝑢31
∗ 𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32
∗ 𝑦32
𝑘
𝑣31
∗ 𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32
∗ ?̃?32
𝑘 + 𝑤2
∗𝑧2
𝑘 (3d) 
3.2 Application of Fuzzy Sets Theory to the Three-stage Network DEA Model  
Given that QoR inputs (i.e., x̃13, x̃23, x̃32) in the proposed model (see Figure 1) are uncertain 
and are related to the behavioral traits of decision makers, they are evaluated by linguistic 
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variables. Sample selection and data gathering procedures are discussed in detail in subsequent 
sections. Linguistic variables, however, are associated with a certain measure of ambiguity 
(Zadeh 1975); in the case of the corporate bond network this is reflected within the expert 
valuations of the identified behavioral factors. Thus, fuzzy sets theory (Zadeh 1965; Bellman 
and Zadeh 1970) was applied to quantify these variables. 
Using the 𝛼-cut method, we computed the upper and lower limits of the 𝛼-cuts of the 
system efficiency according to the model proposed by Kao and Liu (2011). Subsequently, we 
obtained the bounds of each process, considering the limits of system efficiency. This paper 
uses triangular fuzzy numbers (TFN) to quantify linguistic evaluations of experts on behavioral 
factors. TFNs are widely used due to their simplicity and solid theoretical basis (Pedrycz 1994). 
A TFN can be shown as a triple (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3), where 𝑎1, 𝑎2, and 𝑎3 are real numbers and 𝑎1 ≤
𝑎2 ≤ 𝑎3. The membership function of (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3): 
{
 
 
 
 
0,             𝑥 ≤ 𝑎1
𝑥 − 𝑎1
𝑎2 − 𝑎1
, 𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎2
𝑎3 − 𝑥
𝑎3 − 𝑎2
, 𝑎2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎3
0,             𝑥 ≥ 𝑎3
 (4) 
Using (4), the fuzzy variables (i.e., ?̃?13 , ?̃?23 , ?̃?32 ) are specified in the form of fuzzy 
numbers in (5a)–(5c). Therefore, model (2) becomes a fuzzy DEA model. As Hatami-Marbini 
et al. (2011) argued in their taxonomy of fuzzy DEA, the class of α-level approaches is the 
most popular fuzzy DEA model. In this paper, we apply a similar model based on α-level sets 
to solve the fuzzy network DEA model (2). An α-level set is a crisp set of objects with its 
membership degree in fuzzy set being greater than or equal to α. For a TFN (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3), its α-
level set at a given value of α could be specified by a closed interval of [𝑎𝛼
𝐿 , 𝑎𝛼
𝑈] =
[(1 − 𝛼)𝑎1 + 𝛼𝑎2, 𝛼𝑎2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑎3]. Consequently, fuzzy variables (i.e., ?̃?13 , ?̃?23 , ?̃?32) in 
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model (2) are rearranged as TFNs (𝑥13
1 , 𝑥13
2 , 𝑥13
3 ) , (𝑥23
1 , 𝑥23
2 , 𝑥23
3 ) , (𝑥32
1 , 𝑥32
2 , 𝑥32
3 ) . The 
corresponding α-level of this set of TFNs for a specific value of α is as follows: 
[(𝑥13)𝛼
𝐿 , (𝑥13)𝛼
𝑈] = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑥13
1 + 𝛼𝑥13
2 , 𝛼𝑥13
2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥13
3 ] (5a) 
[(𝑥23)𝛼
𝐿 , (𝑥23)𝛼
𝑈] = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑥23
1 + 𝛼𝑥23
2 , 𝛼𝑥23
2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥23
3 ] (5b) 
[(𝑥32)𝛼
𝐿 , (𝑥32)𝛼
𝑈] = [(1 − 𝛼)𝑥32
1 + 𝛼𝑥32
2 , 𝛼𝑥32
2 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥32
3 ] (5c) 
Considering (5a)–(5c), the upper bound efficiency of DMUk at a specific α-level is determined 
by solving the following: 
(𝐸𝑘)𝑎
𝑈 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑢31𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑘  
𝑠. 𝑡.
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13(𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+ 𝑣23(𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+ 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
= 1
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢21𝑦32
𝑘 − (∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13(𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+ 𝑣23(𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+ 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
) ≤ 0
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑗 + 𝑢21𝑦32
𝑗 − (∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑗 + 𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
)
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13(𝑥13
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝑈
+ 𝑣23(𝑥23
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝑈
+ 𝑣31𝑥31
𝑗 + 𝑣32(𝑥32
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝑈
) ≤ 0, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
𝑤1𝑧1
𝑘 − (∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 )
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13(𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
) ≤ 0
𝑤1𝑧1
𝑗 − (∑ (𝑣1𝑖𝑥1𝑖
𝑗
)
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣13(𝑥13
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝑈
) ≤ 0, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
𝑤2𝑧2
𝑘 − (∑ (𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣23(𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+𝑤1𝑧1
𝑘) ≤ 0
𝑤2𝑧2
𝑗 − (∑ (𝑣2𝑖𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
)
2
𝑖=1
+ 𝑣23(𝑥23
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝑈
+𝑤1𝑧1
𝑗) ≤ 0, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑘 − (𝑣31𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+𝑤2𝑧2
𝑘) ≤ 0
𝑢31𝑦31
𝑗 + 𝑢32𝑦32
𝑗 − (𝑣31𝑥31
𝑗 + 𝑣32(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
+𝑤2𝑧2
𝑗) ≤ 0
𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑛
𝑢31, 𝑢32 ≥ 0
𝑣11, 𝑣12, 𝑣13, 𝑣21, 𝑣22, 𝑣23, 𝑣31, 𝑣32 ≥ 0
𝑤1, 𝑤2 ≥ 0
 
(6) 
Similar to model (2), and after calculating optimal values for 𝑢31
∗ , 𝑢32
∗ , 𝑣11
∗ , 𝑣12
∗ , … , 𝑣32
∗ , 
and 𝑤1
∗, 𝑤2
∗, the upper bound overall 𝛼-cut efficiency score of the network and efficiency of its 
sub-processes for DMUk are obtained using the following equations (7a)–(7d): 
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(𝐸𝑘)𝛼
𝑈 =
𝑢31
∗ 𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32
∗ 𝑦32
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖
∗ 𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖
∗ 𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13
∗ (𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+ 𝑣23
∗ (𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+ 𝑣31
∗ 𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32
∗ (𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿  (7a) 
(𝐸𝑘
1)𝛼
𝑈 =
𝑤1
∗𝑧1
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖
∗ 𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13
∗ (𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿  (7b) 
(𝐸𝑘
2)𝛼
𝑈 =
𝑤2
∗𝑧2
𝑘
∑ (𝑣2𝑖
∗ 𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣23
∗ (𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+𝑤1
∗𝑧1
𝑘
 (7c) 
(𝐸𝑘
3)𝛼
𝑈 =
𝑢31
∗ 𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32
∗ 𝑦32
𝑘
𝑣31
∗ 𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32
∗ (𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝐿
+𝑤2
∗𝑧2
𝑘
 (7d) 
The upper bound model presented in model (6) is obtained by setting fuzzy input variables 
for DMUk at their lower bounds, while other DMUs take the upper bound values of these 
variables. Kao and Liu (2011) and Kao and Liu (2014) show that the lower bound efficiency 
of the overall network and its sub-processes is calculated using the dual model of (2). 
According to the duality theorem (Dantzig 1963), the objective functions of the primal and dual 
models of the network in Figure 1 yield the same value. Using the dual of model (2), the lower 
bound efficiency of the overall network at a certain α-level for DMUk is as below: 
(𝐸0)𝑎
𝐿 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜀((∑𝑠1𝑖
𝑣
2
𝑖=1
) + 𝑠13
𝑣 + (∑𝑠2𝑖
𝑣
2
𝑖=1
) + 𝑠23
𝑣 + 𝑠31
𝑣 + 𝑠32
𝑣 + 𝑠1
𝑤 + 𝑠2
𝑤 + 𝑠31
𝑢 + 𝑠32
𝑢 )  
(8) 
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𝑠. 𝑡.
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝜃𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 −∑𝛼𝑗𝑥1𝑖
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛽𝑗𝑥1𝑖
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠1𝑖
𝑣 = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2
𝜃(𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− [𝛼𝑘(𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− ∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑥13
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘
] − [𝛽𝑘(𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑥13
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘
] − 𝑠13
𝑣 = 0
𝜃𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 −∑𝛼𝑗𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛽𝑗𝑥2𝑖
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠2𝑖
𝑣 = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2
𝜃(𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− [𝛼𝑘(𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− ∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑥23
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘
] − [𝛽𝑘(𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑥23
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘
] − 𝑠23
𝑣 = 0
𝜃𝑥31
𝑘 −∑𝛼𝑗𝑥31
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛽𝑗𝑥31
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠31
𝑣 = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2
𝜃(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− [𝛼𝑘(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− ∑ 𝛼𝑗(𝑥32
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘
] − [𝛽𝑘(𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
− ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑥32
𝑗
)
𝛼
𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘
] − 𝑠32
𝑣 = 0
∑𝛽𝑗𝑧1
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛾𝑗𝑧1
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠1
𝑤 = 0
∑𝛾𝑗𝑧2
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛿𝑗𝑧2
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠2
𝑤 = 0
∑𝛼𝑗𝑦31
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛾𝑗𝑦31
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠31
𝑢 = 𝑦31
𝑘
∑𝛼𝑗𝑦32
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
−∑𝛾𝑗𝑦32
𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑠32
𝑢 = 𝑦32
𝑘
𝛼𝑗, 𝛽𝑗, 𝛾𝑗 , 𝛿𝑗 , 𝑠1𝑖
𝑣 , 𝑠13
𝑣 , 𝑠2𝑖
𝑣 , 𝑠23
𝑣 , 𝑠31
𝑣 , 𝑠32
𝑣 , 𝑠1
𝑤, 𝑠2
𝑤 , 𝑠31
𝑢 , 𝑠32
𝑢 ≥ 0
𝑖 = 1,2
𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛
 
 
Once the optimal values 𝑠31
𝑢∗, 𝑠32
𝑢∗, 𝑠11
𝑣∗, 𝑠12
𝑣∗, … , 𝑠1
𝑤∗, 𝑠2
𝑤∗ are determined and replaced by 𝑢31
∗ , 𝑢32
∗ , 
𝑣11
∗ , 𝑣12
∗ , … , 𝑤1
∗, 𝑤2
∗ , the lower bound overall 𝛼 -cut efficiency score of the network and 
efficiency of its sub-processes for DMUk are obtained using the following equations (9a)–(9d): 
(𝐸𝑘)𝛼
𝐿 =
𝑢31
∗ 𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32
∗ 𝑦32
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖
∗ 𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑣2𝑖
∗ 𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13
∗ (𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
+ 𝑣23
∗ (𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
+ 𝑣31
∗ 𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32
∗ (𝑥32
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈 (9a) 
(𝐸𝑘
1)𝛼
𝐿 =
𝑤1
∗𝑧1
𝑘
∑ (𝑣1𝑖
∗ 𝑥1𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣13
∗ (𝑥13
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈 (9b) 
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(𝐸𝑘
2)𝛼
𝐿 =
𝑤2
∗𝑧2
𝑘
∑ (𝑣2𝑖
∗ 𝑥2𝑖
𝑘 )2𝑖=1 + 𝑣23
∗ (𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
+𝑤1
∗𝑧1
𝑘
 (9c) 
(𝐸𝑘
3)𝛼
𝐿 =
𝑢31
∗ 𝑦31
𝑘 + 𝑢32
∗ 𝑦32
𝑘
𝑣31
∗ 𝑥31
𝑘 + 𝑣32
∗ (𝑥23
𝑘 )
𝛼
𝑈
+𝑤2
∗𝑧2
𝑘
 (9d) 
To obtain the fuzzy efficiency of DMUk, the lower bound and upper bound efficiency models 
are solved for α = 0 and α = 1. The triangular fuzzy efficiency of DMUk is determined as 
E0̃ = [(E0)0
L, (E0)1, (E0)0
U] considering (E0)1 = (E0)1
L = (E0)1
U (see Table 2). The values of 
Ej̃, j = 1,2, … , n are the triangular fuzzy efficiencies that will be used to meet the model’s 
objectives. The above-mentioned α-level-based approach could be extended to different 
membership functions by using their corresponding α-levels in the lower-bound and upper-
bound models.  
 
3.3 Case Example 
We investigated corporate bond networks in Iran, including several commercial banks, their 
corporate banks, external investment banks, their corporate clients, and investors. Iran’s 
emerging market, its significant potential for investments, and simultaneous lack of sufficient 
scientific analyzes of its economic and financial environment for the past 36 years have made 
it an intriguing area of exploration by foreign investors (Wright and Thornton 2015). 
Additionally, the fixed 20% coupon on investments in the corporate and government bonds has 
raised global interest in Iran’s bond market (Ramezanpour 2015; Rao 2014). Since its 
inauguration in the 1990s and following the same global standards, issuing and underwriting 
bonds in Iran has created an annual turnover of millions and in some cases billions of US dollars 
(Ramezanpour 2015). Government and corporate bonds were previously issued by independent 
investment banks, but after corporate banking was introduced into Iran’s financial market in 
2007, both investment banks and corporate banks have been competing to gain a larger share 
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of the corporate bond market. According to our model in Figure 1, each DMU consists of a 
specific commercial bank, its corporate bank or an investment bank (underwriter), a corporate 
client (issuer), and investors who purchase the bonds. Including four commercial banks 
(Eghtesad Novin (EN) Bank, Mellat Bank, Melli Bank, and Saman Bank), their corporate 
banking divisions and four investment banks (Amin, Novin, Omid, Sepehr) resulted in 20 
corporate bond networks as independent DMUs (see Table 2). In all these DMUs, members 
have collaborated with each other in at least one relevant bond issuing and underwriting project. 
The names of corporate clients and investors are not included here because of the banks’ 
confidentiality policies. 
 
3.4 Data Collection and Application 
Following the guidelines of Yin (2009), we examined relevant archival data of nominated 
banks and investment banks and official auditing reports issued by the commercial banks and 
Central Bank of Iran to obtain the required data for non-fuzzy inputs, outputs, and intermediary 
inputs/outputs (see Figure 1). Descriptive statistics of the input and output data are available 
upon request. Following the suggestions by Fawcett et al. (2011), we then conducted semi-
structured interviews with representatives from banks, investment banks, corporate clients, and 
investors, in order to determine the values for fuzzy inputs (i.e., quality of relations between 
members of the corporate bond network) within the model. 
We used Critical Incident Technique (CIT) during the interviews to gain a better insight 
into the underlying behavioral factors that adversely affect efficiency in corporate bond 
network. CIT is defined as “a qualitative interview procedure, which facilitates the 
investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes, or issues) identified by 
the respondent, the way they are managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived effects” 
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(Chell 1998). The application of CIT to analyze human behavior, especially in service contexts 
such as the banking industry, has several benefits (Gremler 2004): 
i. it provides a rich source of data by guiding respondents toward giving a range of 
responses based on first-hand experiences and through storytelling (Gabbott and Hogg 
1996), 
ii. it represents what respondents actually think, thus avoiding any preconceptions or hasty 
judgments about how respondents perceive incidents to be important (Chell 1998; 
Stauss 1993), 
iii. it provides rich and concrete information that is applicable by managers and decision 
makers to improve real-world practices (Stauss 1993). 
In addition to the above, CIT is an inductive method and so is most helpful when little is 
known about the topic under investigation (Gremler 2004), such as the study of behavioral 
factors affecting efficiency in the corporate bond network.  
We conducted 22 interviews with representatives from banks, investment banks, corporate 
customers, and investors between December 2013 and March 2014. The interviews were 
conducted to the point where redundancies were occurring and no new sets of incidents were 
achieved (Flanagan 1954). Respondent profiles and a sample of interview protocols are 
presented in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. 
Interviewing time ranged between 30 minutes and two hours. Multiple investigators 
conducted the interviews and analyzed the outcomes to ensure validity of the results 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Benbasat et al. 1987). Sampling process followed the theoretical sampling 
principles of Glaser and Strauss (1967), whereby the relationships between concepts and 
dimensions are revealed in the first few interviews. The sample comprised mostly middle/top 
managers of the banks, corporate banks, investment banks, and the corporate clients as the 
main decision makers of their organization, along with groups of individual customers. The 
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interview protocol was initially developed by the authors and was reviewed by three 
researchers familiar with qualitative research and behavioral sciences. The semi-structured 
interview protocol using CIT (Flanagan 1954) allowed for open discussions unconstrained by 
preconceptions, which made it adjustable to the respondents’ feedback (Gioia et al. 2013).  
The interview protocol consisted of four main parts (Appendix A). Part (A) comprised 
general questions about interviewees’ responsibilities that were relevant to the processes in the 
corporate bond network. Additionally, respondents were asked to remember their negative 
experiences dealing with other members of the corporate bond network and the likely 
behavioral factors behind them. Based on respondents’ experiences, in Part (B) we asked them 
to analyze and prioritize the impact of those experiences on the quality of relations with the 
other member(s) with whom they were directly interacting, and the likelihood of respondents 
continuing to work with those members in the future. In parts (C) and (D) we asked respondents 
if they knew about any possible links relevant to the quality of relations between other members 
of the network and their impact on their negative experiences in the network.  
 
3.5 Data Interpretation 
Data analysis incorporated both content analytic method (Kassarjian 1977) and an interpretive 
approach (Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy 1988). Because the sample was small, transcripts were 
analyzed manually, with two co-authors carrying out the coding. Critical incidents were chosen 
from the content, based on relevance to the topic of study. Considering we were interested in 
the main behavioral factors that could affect efficiency at each stage in the corporate bond 
network, we reported on all identified behavioral factors relevant to bond issuing, underwriting, 
and selling processes as critical incidents, ordered by frequency of mention by respondents. 
Inter-rater reliability of 86% was based on the number of agreed coding decisions to the total 
number of decisions (Kassarjian 1977). Any disagreements about the coding were resolved 
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between the co-authors before reporting the results. The most important critical incidents for 
each stage according to their frequency (above 10%) are reported in Table 1. We also adopted 
an interpretive approach (Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy 1988), delineating the possible causes 
of the behavioral factors identified, since “employing an interpretive approach may help 
researchers better understand emotions in the context of the critical incidents” (Gremler 2004). 
Thus, borrowing from the literature on behavioral operations and supply chain management as 
well as how respondents felt about different situations categorized as critical incidents, we also 
reported on the possible causes of the main behavioral factors in Table 1. We interpreted 
possible causes of the incidents as either independent or linked to other incidents identified in 
the interviews (Edvardsson and Strandvik 2000). For instance, “mistrust”, mentioned by most 
respondents as the overriding behavioral factor affecting the quality of relations in all three 
stages, could stem from either anchoring on past negative experiences, as interpreted by the 
authors, or it could result from the opportunistic behavior by the services supplier (i.e., 
investment bank, corporate bank, or bank), as mentioned by respondents. The interpretations 
of the critical incidents by the authors were examined by four colleagues who were experts in 
behavioral sciences or service supply chains. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 1 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
In addition to the behavioral factors discussed in the literature review section above, Table 
1 includes other behavioral regularities believed to cause inefficiencies in corporate bond 
service networks. For instance, “overestimating financial stability of issuer” in Stage I is 
interpreted to be due to “information avoidance” of bank decision makers, which prevents them 
making unbiased judgments of their corporate customers’ financial stability. Information 
avoidance is the tendency to overlook information that causes discomfort and, in the context 
of supply chain management, it could result in several biased decisions by managers regarding 
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their suppliers, customers, or investments in different projects (Gino and Pisano 2008). Other 
authors provide a description of the behavioral factors, their causes mentioned in Table 1, and 
their application in the context of operations and supply chain management (Gino and Pisano 
2008; Bendoly et al. 2010). Other possible causes of this overestimation could be banks’ 
“overconfidence” in their accurate evaluation of issuers’ financial stability, or continuing to 
work with financially unstable issuers based merely on the costs already incurred and which 
cannot be recovered without considering future losses (i.e., “sunk costs fallacy”). Knowing 
details of the behavioral factors could contribute to more effective post hoc analyses of the 
sources of inefficiencies obtained from the DEA model. We further elaborate on this later in 
the results and discussion section. 
Once respondents had identified all the behavioral factors, they were asked to prioritize 
the quality of their relations with other members in the corporate bond network. Linguistic 
terms were used in the form of five-point Likert scale, with each scale being transformed into 
a TFN (i.e., “very low” (1,1,3), “low”(1,3,5), “neutral” (3,5,7), “high” (5,7,9), and “very high” 
(7,9,9)). The average scores obtained by the interviews specific to each stage for each DMU 
were used in the proposed fuzzy network DEA model. For instance, if investors evaluated 
quality of their relations with Mellat Bank’s officers high on average and they had not noticed 
much misbehaviors the TFN (5,7,9) was replaced as the value of ?̃?32 for all the corporate bonds 
with Mellat Bank in them. The DMUs presented in Table 2, despite having some similarities, 
differ in having either investment banks or corporate banks as their underwriters, and this 
distinction is made in Table 2 by reporting the efficiency scores of those DMUs separately.  
4 Results and discussion 
Table 2 illustrates the numerical outcomes of the study using the proposed fuzzy network 
DEA model, presenting the overall efficiency scores and the efficiency scores in each of the 
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three stages. On average, corporate bond networks with corporate banks as their underwriters 
showed marginally better overall efficiency. However, comparison of stagewise efficiency 
scores reveal that corporate bond networks with investment banks as underwriters were 
performing significantly better in Stage I (𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.00), indicating to more efficienct 
underwriter-issuer operations in this network. Nevertheless, in Stage II corporate bank-bank 
operations showed higher levels of efficiency compared to investment bank-bank operations 
(𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.01). No significant difference is observed in performance of the two networks 
in Stage III. 
Individual rankings of the DMUs showed that while most of the corporate bond networks 
showed higher overall efficiency scores with corporate banks as underwriters, Eghtesad Novin 
Bank was more efficienct when collaborating with investment banks, rather than its own 
corporate bank, for bond issuance and underwriting. In fact, the corporate bond network of 
Eghtesad Novin- Novin Investment Bank has the highest efficiency score among all other 
DMUs. Another observation from Table 2 and Figure 3 is a surprisingly lower efficiency in 
issuer-corporate bank operations compared to other stages in these networks. This could have 
serious implictaions for banks to increase supervision and control over how corporate banks 
are dealing with corporate customers for bond underwriting and issuance purposes. We will 
delve deeper into the specific sources of inefficiencies for all networks in the next section.  
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 2 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the comparisons between efficiency scores in different stages for the 
corporate bond network with investment banks or corporate banks as underwriters. In both 
figures, the efficiency level of the network in Stage III is higher than in the other two stages. 
However, the patterns of overall efficiency scores and Stage II efficiency scores are most 
similar. This could be an indicator that the performance of bank and underwriter in Stage II is 
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determinant of the overall efficiency of the corporate bond network. Thus, this could be 
interpreted as banks paying specific attention to bank-underwriter operations in the corporate 
bonds network to ensure an acceptable overall efficiency in this network. 
In order to determine with more certainty which sets of inputs or outputs in the corporate 
bond network model have the highest levels of impact on the overall efficiency, we conducted 
several tests of sensitivity and a robustness check of the efficiency scores to variations in inputs 
and outputs. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Initially, we tested the sensitivity of the results to the sample size. Overall, the model in 
Figure 1 had twelve inputs, outputs, and intermediary inputs/outputs. As a general heuristic, 
this requires at least 36 (12*3) DMUs to ensure an acceptable level of discrimination. Kao 
(2009), however, explains that in network DEA models the total number of DMUs are 
multiplied by the number of sub-processes. Considering the total number of 20 DMUs and 
three sub-processes (20*3>12*3), we are confident that our sample size was sufficient. Table 
3 illustrates potential improvements in efficiency scores by making changes in the inputs and 
outputs of the corporate bond network model, compared with the benchmark frontier. The 
results are reported using the full sample and two subsamples that represent networks with 
either corporate banks or investment banks as their underwriters. 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Insert Table 3 about here 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
As shown in Table 3, most inefficiencies in the first two stages stem mainly from “quality 
of relations” (QoR) between either underwriter and issuer or bank and underwriter. Further 
investigation of sources of inefficiencies for QoR revealed that, while in Stage I corporate 
banks show a poorer quality of relations with issuers, in Stage II investment banks’ relations 
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with banks has more potential for improvement. Considering a significantly lower level of 
efficiency in Stage I for the networks with corporate banks as their underwriters (see Figure 3), 
Table 3 reveals that the overriding priotity for improvement in these networks should be 
improving the relations between banks and their own corporate banking divisions. 
Additionally, in Stage III most of the inefficiencies are embedded in QoR and also “proportion 
of bonds sold to total” (SBT), which calls for the banks’ decision makers to pay attention to 
their relations with their investors, gaining their trust, and using alternative marketing strategies 
to sell the bonds. 
 
4.1 Managerial Implications 
The results of this study reveal that managers should pay equal attention to operational and 
behavioral factors when addressing inefficiencies within supply networks. The sources of 
inefficiencies in the corporate bond network identified in Table 2 indicate that the quality of 
bilateral relations should be improved in all three stages. As discussed earlier, we posited 
several reasons for the poor quality of relations depicted in the three stages of corporate bond 
networks. Taking this into consideration, we recommend that managers take the following 
steps to help overcome inefficiencies caused by behavioural issues throughout their supply 
network. 
First, for instance in Stage I, having identified and acknowledged goals by the employees 
regarding the quality of services they offer to the issuer, managers should implement a control 
and feedback mechanism to constantly monitor individuals’ motivation levels, thereby keeping 
employees of investment banks or corporate banks motivated enough to provide quality 
services to issuers. Second, managers should apply control mechanisms and supervision over 
issuers (especially the investment bank) to preclude them adopting opportunistic behavior. The 
latter should also be addressed by strengthening trust levels between bank and issuer. Third, 
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managers should implement debiasing strategies to reduce the impact of identified behavioral 
biases (e.g., anchoring, overconfidence, suck costs fallacy) on the quality of decisions made in 
Stage I by providing warnings and awareness about the decision biases, decomposing complex 
decision tasks into smaller components, and applying multiple perspectives to view decision 
tasks (Kaufmann et al. 2009; Tokar et al. 2012).  
Other debiasing measures to be taken in supply chains can reduce the effects of dynamism 
in the decision-making context (Haines et al. 2010; Kaufmann et al. 2009). Overall, the extent 
of dynamism in the environment moderates between rational and comprehensive decision 
making and decision quality (Hough and White 2003). Reducing dynamism in Stage I and in 
the corporate bond network in general requires identifying changes in business and updating 
marketing strategies for the bonds, and applying tools and mechanisms that could detect and 
address changes in both external and internal operational and behavioral factors affecting 
efficiency in this network. Furthermore, an unambiguous set of information could help reduce 
complexities in the decision-making environment, leading to fewer biases in the decision-
making process (Kaufmann et al. 2009). This could be achieved in the corporate bond network 
by developing databases that could capture and analyze all information relevant to the 
operational and behavioral factors identified in this study. In fact, gathering information more 
frequently and efficiently, especially in dynamic environments such as supply networks, is 
believed to be critical to engage decision makers in “procedural rationality” as an important 
decision-making approach (Riedl et al. 2013; Haines et al. 2010). 
In Stage II, quality of relations between underwriters and banks was identified as the 
primary source of inefficiency in the corporate bond network (Table 2). The deteriorating 
relations in this stage could have adverse consequences on Stage I in terms of opportunistic 
behavior of the underwriter, as discussed above. To avoid this outcome, the same measures and 
debiasing strategies discussed for Stage I should be adopted. Additionally, in Stage III, both 
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operational and behavioral factors had significant negative effects on the stage-wise and overall 
efficiency of the network (Table 2). First, the proportion of bonds sold in relation to the total 
quantity of bonds is contingent upon several behavioral and non-behavioral factors. The non-
behavioral factors are usually context-specific and depend upon the return on investment 
promised by parallel markets (in case of Iran’s market, the real estate industry for instance 
offers much higher returns on investment than the bonds market) or the quality of bonds and 
marketing strategies for the bonds to attract investors. Similarly, the overriding behavioral 
factors affecting investors’ decisions to purchase the bonds include, for example, trust between 
investors and bank and the reputation of corporate customer and bank as issuer and seller of 
the bonds. Thus, managers should consider that operational inefficiencies identified in the 
supply networks could stem equally from behavioral and operational factors, or perhaps even 
more from behavioral factors in some cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study attempted to highlight the role of behavioral factors in analytical models used in the 
operations and supply chain management domain. By adopting a multi-method approach, we 
incorporated behavioral misconducts of decision makers in standard DEA models for 
measuring bank efficiency, and we gathered relevant data on behavioral factors using semi-
structured interviews and critical incident technique. We developed a fuzzy network DEA 
model to reveal the sources of inefficiencies in issuer-underwriter, underwriter-bank, and bank-
investor interrelations in the presence of behavioral factors in this network. The results showed 
marginal differences in the efficiency of the networks with either investment banks or corporate 
banks as their underwriters. Conducting sensitivity analysis on the inputs and outputs of the 
model in three stages revealed that behavioral factors in corporate bond networks could 
significantly affect efficiency scores in the network. 
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While we envisioned mainly decision making-related scenarios that could be disrupted by 
decision makers’ bounded rationality, the results from the case analysis showed additional 
behavioral issues present in the bilateral relations throughout the corporate bond network. From 
this aspect, a limitation of this study framework was that it adopted a general approach toward 
all the behavioral issues identified in the DEA modeling of the network. Analyzing specific 
behavioral factors in supply networks would provide more in-depth knowledge of the root 
causes of errors in judgment and decision making, although such analyses would be limited in 
number because of the over-complexity of the behavioral models. A second limitation is that 
we utlized semi-structured interviews and critical incident techniques to gain insight into the 
behavioral misconducts within the banking industry, despite some authors arguing that 
laboratory experiments are preferable (Knemeyer and Naylor 2011) because they control for 
irrelevant biases that might cause errors in the final results of the analyzes.  
We recommend that researchers consider incorporating behavioral factors into their 
performance and efficiency assessment models of supply networks, in order to improve the 
application of these models to real-world problems. Moreover, the outcomes of this study 
suggest that decision makers should be more aware of intangible variables, including those 
behavioral factors in their interrelations with their counterparts in supply networks in general 
and in the corporate bond service networks in particular. 
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Appendix A. Profile of the interviews 
No. Organization Respondent’s functional position Date (2013-2014) 
1 Mellat Bank Head of Corporate Banking Division 18 December  
2 Eghtesad Novin Bank Head of Research and Planning Centre 20 December  
3 Amin Investment Bank Head of the Investment Bank 25 December  
4 Omid Investment Bank Head of the Investment Bank 31 December  
5 Melli Bank Member of Board of Directors 8 January 
6 Omid Investment Bank Head of Financial Risk Mgt. Division 16 January 
7 Novin Investment Bank Head of the Investment Bank 22 January 
8 Melli Bank Head of Retail Banking Division 24 January 
9 Saman Bank Member of Board of Directors 30 January 
10 Novin Investment Bank Head of Financial Risk and Controlling 5 February 
11 Sepehr Investment Bank Director, Research and Development 9 February 
12 Saman Bank Member of Board of Directors 12 February 
13 Amin Investment Bank Head the Investment Bank 14 February 
14 Sepehr Investment Bank Director, Risk Analysis and Mgt. Division 20 February 
15 Corporate Client #1* Director, CFO Division 28 February 
16 Corporate Client #2* Head of Strategic Management 3 March 
17 Corporate Client #3* Director, CFO Division 6 March 
18 Corporate Client #4* Director, CFO Division 10 March 
19 Investor representatives#1* - 18 March 
20 Investor representatives#2* - 23 March 
21 Investor representatives#3* - 25 March 
22 Investor representatives#4* - 28 March 
* To maintain confidentiality of the information entrusted by the nominated banks and investment banks to the authors, names 
of corporate clients and investor representatives are not revealed in this study. 
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Appendix B. Interview protocol: Corporate client’s perspective 
Interview info                                                          Respondent’s information:  
Interview number:                                                      Full name: 
Date:                                                                           Age: 
Time:                                                                          Position: 
Location:                                                                    Working experience in finance (years): 
Co-interviewer:                                                          Years in current position: 
Guidelines and Questions Observations 
 Appreciating the respondent for his/her participation and appointment. 
 Explaining the research purpose and scientific terms required to respond to 
the questions. 
 Explaining the risks/benefits of participation. 
 Explaining their withdrawal rights. 
 Asking if they have any concerns/questions. 
 Getting their permission to use the voice recorder. 
 Turning on the voice recorder. 
______________________
______________________
______________________
______________________
______________________
______________________
______________________
______ 
A General info 
[Ice breaking and 
building rapport with the 
respondent] 
Q01 
Please tell us about your main responsibilities (History, Products/ 
Services). 
 
Q02 
Please tell us about the tasks associated with your position relevant to 
negotiating with underwriters and bank representatives (responsibilities, 
reporting, how many people you manage). 
 
Q03 
Describe situation(s), if any, which you considered to be adversely 
affecting your relations with the corporate bank and/or bank that provides 
your company a variety of financial services. 
 
Q04 
Could you share your opinion about the core behavioral drivers that 
caused such situation(s)? 
 
B Stage I [Main questions/answers] 
Q05 
How much has the adverse situation(s) affected your manner of 
cooperation with the underwriter and/or the bank in the bond underwriting 
processes? Please explain and prioritize. 
 
Q06 
How likely are you to choose the same bank and/or investment/corporate 
bank as your underwriter and issuer again? Please explain and prioritize. 
 
C Stage II  
Q07 
How much do you think the quality of relations between the bank and the 
underwriter has caused the adverse situations that you experienced? 
Please explain and prioritize. 
 
D Stage III  
Q08 
How much do you think the quality of relations between the bank and the 
investors has caused the adverse situations that you experienced? Please 
explain and prioritize. 
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Figure 1. Corporate bond network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: PE (personnel expenses), OOE (other operational expenses), QoR (quality of relations), NoF 
(number of referrals), NV (net value of issued bonds), SBT (proportion of sold bonds to total), NFC 
(net fees and commissions) 
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Figure 2. Comparison of efficiency scores at 𝛼 = 1 for corporate bond network with 
investment banks as underwriters 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of efficiency scores at 𝛼 = 1 for corporate bond network with 
corporate banks as underwriters 
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Table 1. Behavioral factors affecting quality of relations in the corporate bond network in three stages 
Stage I (underwriter-issuer operations) Stage II (bank-underwriter operations) Stage III (investor-bank operations) 
Behavioral factor Frequency Possible cause Behavioral factor Frequency Possible cause 
Behavioral 
factor 
Frequency Possible cause 
Mistrust 38% 
Anchoring of issuer 
Opportunistic 
behavior by 
underwriter 
Mistrust 46% 
Anchoring of bank 
Opportunistic 
behavior by 
underwriter 
Mistrust 42% 
Anchoring of 
investor 
Opportunistic 
behavior by bank 
Unethical and 
unprofessional 
behavior by the 
issuer 
19% 
Lack of motivation, 
feedback and 
control on 
underwriter’s 
employees 
Banks favoring 
existing corporate 
customers over 
obtaining new 
customers 
10% 
Loss aversion of 
bank decision 
makers 
Unethical and 
unprofessional 
behavior by the 
bank 
22% 
Lack of 
motivation, 
feedback and 
control on bank’s 
employees 
 
Overestimating 
financial stability 
of issuer (default 
risk) 
12% 
Overconfidence of 
bank decision 
makers 
Information 
avoidance of bank 
decision makers 
Sunk costs fallacy 
of bank decision 
makers 
Opportunistic 
behavior of the 
issuer 
10% 
Illusion of control 
by banks decision 
makers and lack of 
sufficient 
supervisory 
mechanisms 
Investors’ 
unwillingness to 
purchase the 
bonds 
16% 
Conservatism of 
investors 
Risk aversion of 
investors 
Mistrust 
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Table 2. Efficiency scores of the corporate bond underwriting and issuance network 
DMU Overall efficiency score 
(?̃?𝒋) 
Overall 
rank 
Stage I efficiency score 
(?̃?𝒋
𝟏) 
Stage II efficiency score 
(?̃?𝒋
𝟐) 
Stage III efficiency score 
(?̃?𝒋
𝟑) 
DMUs with corporate banks as underwriters     
ENa Bank- EN Corporate Bank (0.94, 0.95, 0.99) 8 (0.18, 0.19, 0.35) (0.9, 0.9, 0.96)  (1, 1, 1) 
Mellat Bank - Mellat Corporate Bank (0.94, 0.97, 1) 4 (0.26, 0.26, 0.27) (0.98, 0.98, 1) (0.95, 0.97, 1)   
Melli Bank- Melli Corporate Bank (0.96, 1, 1) 2 (0.23,  0.39, 0.49)  (0.97, 1, 1) (0.98, 1, 1) 
Saman Bank - Saman Corporate Bank (0.95, 0.98, 1) 3 (0.23, 0.23, 0.40) (1, 1, 1) (0.95, 0.98, 1)   
Mean  (0.95, 0.98, 1)  (0.23, 0.27, 0.38) (0.96, 0.97, 0.99) (0.97, 0.99, 1) 
Number of efficient DMUs  0  0 1 1 
DMUs with investment banks as underwriters     
EN Bank- Amin Investment Bank (0.80, 0.80, 0.93) 12 (0.25, 0.25, 1) (0.75, 0.75, 0.89) (1, 1, 1) 
EN Bank- Novin Investment Bank (1, 1, 1) 1 (0.54, 0.63, 0.63)   (0.84, 0.9, 1) (1, 1, 1) 
EN Bank- Omid Investment Bank (0.83, 0.92, 1) 9 (0.83, 0.83, 1) (0.94, 0.94, 1) (0.88, 0.92, 1)  
EN Bank- Sepehr Investment Bank (0.89, 1, 1) 7 (0.68, 0.68, 1) (0.95, 0.95, 1) (0.93, 1, 1) 
Mellat Bank - Amin Investment Bank (0.91, 0.99, 1) 5 (0.93, 1, 1)  (1, 1, 1) (0.91, 0.99, 1)   
Mellat Bank - Novin Investment Bank (0.9, 1, 1) 6 (0.78, 0.78, 1)   (0.91, 0.91, 0.96)   (0.97, 1, 1) 
Mellat Bank - Omid Investment Bank (0.67, 0.68, 0.71) 20 (0.85, 0.85, 1)  (0.61, 0.61, 0.61)  (1, 1, 1) 
Mellat Bank - Sepehr Investment Bank (0.69, 0.72, 1) 17 (0.97, 0.98, 1) (0.67, 0.67, 1) (0.93, 0.99, 1)   
Melli Bank - Amin Investment Bank (0.72, 0.76, 1) 15 (0.85, 0.86, 1) (0.70, 0.70, 1) (0.95, 1, 1) 
Melli Bank - Novin Investment Bank (0.70, 0.74, 1) 16 (1, 1, 1) (0.68, 0.68, 1) (0.94, 0.99, 1)  
Melli Bank - Omid Investment Bank (0.59, 0.63, 1) 19 (1, 1, 1) (0.62, 0.63, 1) (0.84, 0.89, 1)  
Melli Bank - Sepehr Investment Bank (0.78, 0.79, 0.81) 18 (0.80, 0.80, 1) (0.78, 0.78, 0.78) (.097, 0.97, 1)  
Saman Bank - Amin Investment Bank (0.78, 0.80, 1) 11 (0.82, 0.82, 0.91) (0.77, 0.77, 0.78) (1, 1, 1) 
Saman Bank - Novin Investment Bank (0.80, 0.83, 1) 10 (0.82, 0.82, 0.93) (0.83, 0.83, 1) (0.96, 0.97, 1)   
Saman Bank - Omid Investment Bank (0.74, 0.77, 1) 13 (0.87, 0.87, 1) (0.75, 0.75, 0.75) (0.94, 0.98, 1) 
Saman Bank - Sepehr Investment Bank (0.74, 0.77, 1) 13 (0.84, 0.84, 1) (0.76, 0.76, 1) (0.97, 0.97, 1) 
Mean  (0.78, 0.83, 0.97)  (0.80, 0.81, 0.97) (0.79, 0.79, 0.92) (0.89, 0.98, 1) 
Number of efficient DMUs  1  2 1 4 
Mann-Whitney U (Prob > X2, one-
tailed) 
13.50 (0.08)  2.00 (0.00) b 6.50 (0.01) b 30.00 (0.89) 
Wilcoxon W (Prob > X2, one-tailed) 149.50 (0.08)  12.00 (0.00) b 142.50 (0.01) b 166.00 (0.89) 
a Eghtesad Novin 
b Significant at 0.01 level 
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Table 3. Forecast changes in inputs and outputs against the benchmark frontier (%) 
Stage I (underwriter-issuer operations) 
 Excess PEc Excess OOE Excess QoR  
Full sample 0.00 –1.30 –8.69  
Subsample 1a 0.00 –0.76 –10.62  
Subsample 2b 0.00 0.00 –3.64  
Stage II (bank-underwriter operations) 
 Excess PEd Excess OOE Excess QoR  
Full sample –0.44 0.00 –3.41  
Subsample 1 0.00 0.00 –2.47  
Subsample 2 –0.85 0.00 –6.63  
Stage III (investor-bank operations) 
 Excess PE Excess QoR Shortage SBTe Shortage NFC 
Full sample –1.22 –1.22 –3.66 2.55 
Subsample 1 –1.38 –1.38 –3.42 6.54 
Subsample 2 –1.37 –1.37 –2.00 6.43 
a Sample with corporate banks as underwriters 
b Sample with investment banks as underwriters 
c Excess indicates to percentage decrease in inputs and shortage indicates increase to outputs against efficient 
frontier.  
  Bold numbers illustrate the largest changes projected. 
d PE (personnel expenses), OOE (other operational expenses), QoR (quality of relations) 
e SBT (proportion of sold bonds to total), NFC (net fees and commissions) 
